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Must We Talk about Populism? Interrogating Populism’s
Conceptual Utility in a Context of Crisis
Barry Cannon
Department of Sociology, Maynooth University, Maynooth, Ireland
ABSTRACT
John Gerring identifies eight criteria to help assess the utility of a
concept: familiarity, resonance, parsimony, coherence, differentia-
tion, depth, theoretical utility, and field utility. Populism has often
been challenged on these despite much work done by scholars to
help clarify and sharpen the concept. Nevertheless, three central
criticisms persist: the term remains conceptually loose; analysis is
often underpinned by an unacknowledged normative bias toward
liberal democracy; and, the concept often acts as a label used to
sideline challengers to the political status quo, despite crucial
differences between these on socio-economic, political, and iden-
tity inequalities. Its conceptual utility is therefore questionable as
so-called populism displaces the inequalities; particularly, political
inequality, which originally engendered the phenomena in the
first place. The article concludes by recommending a return to
more traditional concepts such as the left/right axis to help redir-
ect debate to more promising lines of inquiry, which can help
resolve what I call the “crisis of inequalities.”
Introduction
There is a specter haunting global politics, and some of the leading politicians in Europe
and the Americas know it. President of the European Commission,1 Jean Claude Juncker,
French ex-President, Francoise Hollande (2012–2017),2 Chancellor of Germany,3 Angela
Merkel (2005-present), and, ex-US President, Barack Obama (2009–2017),4 are all con-
vinced that populism is bad for democracy. The media seems to be equally concerned,
with populism being mentioned in 695 headlines in the world’s major English language
news publications between January 1, 2015 and May 4, 2017.5 Similar searches in
CONTACT Barry Cannon barry.cannon@mu.ie
1Holly Ellyat, “Europe Faces ‘Galloping Populism,’ Juncker Warns in State of the Union Address,” CNBC (September 14,
2016), available online at: http://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/14/europe-faces-galloping-populism-juncker-warns-in-state-
of-the-union-address.html.
2France 24, “France’s Hollande Reacts to Trump Win, Calls for ‘Unity’ in Face of Rising Populism,” France 24, International
News 24/7 (November 16, 2016), available online at: http://www.france24.com/en/20161115-live-french-president-
francois-hollande-interview-france-24-tv5-monde-rfi.
3AFP, “Angela Merkel: The Rise of Populist Parties is Remarkable and Regrettable,” The Journal.ie (May 26, 2014),
available online at: http://www.thejournal.ie/angela-merkel-european-elections-1486214-May2014/.
4AFP, “Barack Obama Hits Out at ‘Populist Strongmen’ Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump in Last UN Address,” ABC News
(September 20, 2016), available online at: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-09-21/obama-hits-at-populist-strong
men-in-last-un-address/7863656.
5Based on a Lexis Nexis search for “populism” conducted by the author during this period.
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Spanish (results 2,618), French (663), Italian (709), and German (1,070) language news
outlets also show considerable concern about the phenomenon. Populism has, of
course, been of long-standing academic concern; particularly, in the post-World War II
era, and most especially since the end of the Cold War.6 This concern continues
unabated, with 1,865 academic resources in English with “populism” in the title pub-
lished between 2013 and 2017.7
This article seeks to critically examine this concern. In particular, it seeks to question if
the concept of populism remains a useful one for the social sciences in the current
context of what I call the “crisis of inequalities.” While the current consensus seems to
suggest that the world is emerging from the impact of the 2008 financial crisis,8 socio-
economic inequality continues to rise on a global scale, albeit at different speeds.9
Moreover, socio-economic inequality is further crossed by gender, sexual, ethnic, and
other inequalities, through what feminist scholars identify as intersectionality.10 Rising
socio-economic inequality is important, as it “affects, and is affected by everything, from
the growth of the economy, to the structure of the welfare state, to the involvement of
citizens in the democratic process.”11 On this last point alone, as: “Poor people, on
average, vote less frequently than richer people,. . .a high level of inequality enhances
this effect.”12 This can result in endogenous political processes perpetuating high
inequality, resulting in a vicious spiral of ever-reducing collective welfare and political
exclusion of the poor.13
As a result of this crisis of inequalities, increasing popular disenchantment with
actually existing liberal democracy has emerged.14 I understand liberal democracy
here through the lens of William I. Robinson’s critique of polyarchy, which “refers to a
system in which a small group actually rules, on behalf of capital, and participation in
decision-making by the majority is confined to choosing among competing elites in
tightly controlled electoral processes.”15 Polyarchy is being increasingly questioned by
citizens in the post-Cold War contemporary context for three key reasons.16 First, there is
a banishment of discourse on class from political debate, even as the policies enacted by
political parties of the “extreme center”17 exacerbate class tensions and enrich a tiny
6Marco D’Eramo, “Populism and the New Oligarchy,” New Left Review 82 (July-August 2013), pp. 5–28.
7Found in a WordCat search conducted by the author through Maynooth University.
8IMF, “World Economic Outlook Update,” International Monetary Fund: World Economic Outlook (January 22, 2018),
available online at: http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2018/01/11/world-economic-outlook-update-jan
uary-2018.
9Facundo Alvaredo, Lucas Chancel, Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Gabriel Zucman, World Inequality Report 2018:
Executive Summary (World Inequality Lab, 2018), p. 4, available online at: http://wir2018.wid.world/files/download/
wir2018-summary-english.pdf.
10See for example Sylvia Walby, Jo Armstrong, and Sofia Strid, “Intersectionality: Multiple Inequalities in Social Theory,”
Sociology 46:2 (2012), pp. 224–40; Hae Yeon Choo and Myra Marx Ferree, “Practicing Intersectionality in Sociological
Research: A Critical Analysis of Inclusions, Interactions, and Institutions in the Study of Inequalities,” Sociological
Theory 28:2 (2010), pp. 129–49. See also the Special Issue on “Intersectionality in the Global Age,” New Political
Science 37:4 (2015).
11Carsten Jensen and Kees van Kersbergen, The Politics of Inequality (London, UK; New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan
Educational, 2017), p. 2.
12Ibid., 5.
13John Echeverri-Gent, “Persistent High Inequality as an Endogenous Political Process,” PS: Political Science and Politics
42:4 (2009), pp. 633–38.
14See for example Colin Crouch, Post-democracy (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 2004); Peter Mair, “Ruling the Void? The
Hollowing of Western Democracy,” New Left Review 42 (2006), pp. 25–51.
15William I. Robinson, “Latin America and Global Capitalism,” Race and Class 40:2–3 (1998/99), pp. 111–31.
16D’Eramo, “Populism and the New Oligarchy,” pp. 3–25.
17Tariq Ali, The Extreme Center: A Second Warning (London, UK; New York, NY: Verso, 2018).
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minority at the expense of the majority. Second, there is an expansion of “negative
power” – that is, powers of prevention, surveillance, and evaluation – in favor of
“independent” central banks and international financial institutions, such as the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as private ratings agencies, all
of them unelected and unaccountable to citizens. Third, there is a substantial reduction
of the scope of democratic decision-making, through a narrowing of party political
programmatic differentiation, all of which must adhere to the dictates of the previously
mentioned negative powers. The result has been the consolidation of an oligarchic
regime that ensures that “the elites are not subject to the same legal regime as the
rest of the population.”18
This disenchantment with liberal democracy has been seen in Europe, with the
emergence of many new left- and right-wing movements; in Latin America with the
emergence of a “pink-tide” of left-wing governments, beginning with the election of
Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 1998; and, more recently in the United States (US) with the
ascendance of Donald Trump to the presidency. What links these political phenomena is
a rejection of actually existing liberal democracy and a search for a new, more popularly
responsive democracy that can reverse the previously mentioned de-democratizing
dynamics in some if not all of these areas of inequality. This can involve not only a
minimalist model of elections, but also can include more direct and participatory forms
of democracy, such as referenda or participatory budgeting, and more equitable social-
economic outcomes.19 While these political phenomena have almost uniformly been
labeled populist, I eschew such neat characterizations, and instead define populism as a
theoretical academic tradition used, intentionally or not, to negatively counterpose
electorally democratic but non-liberal political organizations with polyarchy. It is there-
fore an intellectual movement that prioritizes the protection of polyarchy over the
eradication of the very inequalities, which give rise to these variegated political phe-
nomena, and as such is a self-defeating exercise that can only be broken if social science
abandons the concept and seeks more accurate conceptual tools, which can better help
eradicate such inequalities.
The article will proceed in the following manner. First, I will give an overview of the
different conceptual meanings ascribed to populism historically, arguing that while
there may be an emerging consensus around what is called a “minimal” ideological
position, other meanings remain equally active in discourse, leading to conceptual
confusion. Second, using John Gerring’s work on conceptual utility,20 I will argue that
despite much work to help clarify and sharpen the concept, three central criticisms
persist: (1) the term remains conceptually loose; (2) there is an unacknowledged norma-
tive bias equating democracy with its liberal variant; and, (3) in consequence, the term
can simply become a label that sidelines challengers to the political status quo, ironing
out crucial political, ideological, and programmatic differences key to discussion in the
context of a “crisis of inequalities.” Ultimately, then, questions remain about the utility of
18D’Eramo, “Populism and the New Oligarchy,” p. 25.
19See for example Merkel’s three democratic models in Wolfgang Merkel, “’Crisis of Democracy’: Analytical Concept or
Empty Signifier?” Paper presented to ECPR 8th General Conference, Glasgow, United Kingdom: ECPR (2014), pp. 3–7,
available online at: https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/0f0d1311-25e6-4cc2-964f-cdd44aa5ae6b.pdf.
20John Gerring, “What Makes a Concept Good? A Critical Framework for Understanding Concept Formation in the Social
Sciences,” Polity 31:3 (1999), pp. 357–93.
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the concept in such a context, questions which are particularly urgent, as its analytical
use goes beyond regions traditionally associated with it, such as Latin America.21
I then illustrate these points empirically by providing a critical examination on commentary
in the USmedia comparing Presidents Hugo Chávez of Venezuela and Donald J. Trump in the
United States. Here, I argue that in these comparisons, analytical use of the term obscures the
radical differences between both presidents on a contextual, ideological, political, and policy
level, in favor of more weakly defined commonalities on discourse and style. The effect of this
is to obscure much more fundamental discussions on the nature, content, and objectives of
democracy, which in fact underlie this discussion. I then go on to show why this is important
through a discussion on the concept of crisis. Here, I review Benjamin Moffitt’s work on the
role of crisis in theory on populism, and argue, through readings of work on the issue by Janet
Roitman, Sylvia Walby, and Wolfgang Merkel, that crises are ill-defined periods, subject to
temporal, definitional, and policy manipulation by hegemonic social forces through narrative
and discourse.22 Work on populism, I argue, is in fact part of that wider discourse, with use of
the concept shaping the discussion on the contemporary “crisis of inequalities” in support of a
relatively unreconstructed liberal democracy, despite its role in helping such inequalities in
the first place.
This leads to my speculating as to why populism remains a preferred explanatory and
analytical concept for such differing political phenomena, despite its theoretical vagueness
and lack of conceptual depth. Here, I argue that this is due to the concept’s denigration of the
popular and denial of the increasing gaps in the conditions of elites and ordinary people
wrought by widening inequality. In other words, the concept provides very little critical
challenge to the liberal ideological status quo, and indeed can uncritically support it. Yet, it
is the former, not the latter role, which is a central duty of social scientists; particularly, in the
current context of crisis. The best way to achieve this, I argue, is to restore the use of the left/
right dichotomy as the primary descriptor of political phenomena, rather than the catch-all
conceptual vagueness of populism.
Populism: The Theoretical Development of a Concept
Populism, as is usually acknowledged, is a highly contested concept with distinct approaches
to its study. This section will trace its emergence in the nineteenth century until the present to
illustrate its complex, layered meanings in the literature, which ultimately contribute to its
conceptual vagueness. The concept first emerged in reference to two distinct political phe-
nomena in post-Civil War United States and in Tsarist Russia in the latter half of the nineteenth
century. The American People’s Party was founded in 1892, with an aim to represent farmers
and workers who felt forgotten by themainstream Democratic and Republican parties.23 As it
21See for example: Carlos de la Torre (ed.), The Promise and Perils of Populism: Global Perspectives (Lexington, KT:
University Press of Kentucky, 2015); Benjamin Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and
Representation (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016); Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser and Cas Mudde, Populism in
Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy? (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
22Benjamin Moffitt, “How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary
Populism,” Government and Opposition 50:2 (2015) pp. 189–217; Janet Roitman, “Crisis,” Political Concepts (2011),
available online at: http://www.politicalconcepts.org/issue1/crisis/; Sylvia Walby, Crisis (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2015);
Merkel, “Crisis of Democracy.”
23Tim Houwen, “The Non-European Roots of the Concept of Populism,” Working Paper No 120, Sussex European
Institute, University of Sussex and Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen (2011), p. 9, available online at: https://www.sussex.
ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=sei-working-paper-no-120.pdf&site=266.
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grew in popularity, it frequently was referred to by its adversaries as “populist,” although the
precise origins of the term are difficult to determine.24 Tim Houwen notes how the term
generates bothpositive andnegative connotations from thesebeginnings.25On theonehand,
the People’s Party campaigned for the US Republic to be returned to the “people” as the
holders of sovereignty.26 On the other, it was used to refer to those who appealed to the
“common people” or the “mob” and was hence inherently anti-democratic.27 Hence, the term
has a discursive purpose from the outset, in which both “positive and negative connotations
can be distinguished,”28 contributing to its conceptual looseness.
Similarly, the use of the concept “populist” to describe the narodnichestvo, which
emerged in Tsarist Russia, is also disputed. The term has a specific and more general
meaning: specific in that it refers to a “revolutionary movement of young intellectuals,
who were resisting the Tsarist regime” around 1870;29 generally, referring to a variety of
revolutionary movements right up to the Bolshevik revolution of 1917.30 Both shared the
aim of enriching their ideas and practices through more direct contact with Russian
peasants, whom they viewed as bearers of a more direct route to socialism, bypassing
capitalism. How they both became labeled “populist” is disputed, however, and
attempts to link them are analytically loose.31 Yet, both could be seen to be positive
attempts to highlight and solve class grievances, rather than the negative attributes
normally associated with populism.
The concept mostly falls into disuse thereafter, until, in the post-World War II period,
it begins to acquire more general usage. According to Kenneth M. Roberts, there are four
approaches or perspectives by which it is used from thence on.32 First, there is what he
terms the historical/sociological perspective, emphasizing populism as a consequence of
and necessary stage toward economic and social development. Second, there is the
economic perspective, which identifies populism with expansionist and redistributive
economic policies. A third perspective is a political perspective, which equates populism
with vertical or leader-led popular mobilization at the expense of existing democratic
institutions to foster direct leader/people communication. Fourth, there is what Roberts
terms an ideological perspective, emphasizing an ideological discourse based on the
“people” against those in power, the “underdog” against the “elite.”
The historical/sociological perspective was led by Latin American analysts such as Gino
Germani, Torcuato di Tella, and Octavio Ianni. They argued that economic and social
modernization in developing societies creates a situation of permanent change, which
produces a “disposable mass” of people, usually from the newly urbanized popular
classes. These, it is argued, are prone to support authoritarian leaders and/or move-
ments, who then facilitate and encourage the mobilization and participation of the
popular classes in the exercise of power. Notable in this perspective is a distinct distrust
of the masses and their ability to recognize and support good government.








32Kenneth M. Roberts, “Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America: The Peruvian Case,” World
Politics 48:82 (1995), pp. 82–116.
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Linked to this perspective is the economic perspective, whereby populism is associated
with a policy of welfare and economic protectionism. It has a nationalist industrial and
economic strategy, protecting jobs in local industry and, through nationalization, the control
of local raw materials and key industries. By prioritizing local industrial growth and social
welfare, it builds cross-class alliances, such as between the domestic industrial classes, the
industrial working classes, or the bureaucratic and mercantile middle classes. By the 1980s,
some viewed these polices as “fiscally irresponsible,” as they ignored risks to inflation, balance
of payments deficits and debts, and ultimately led to economic crises. 33 Hence, populismhere
is associated with “profligate” state spending, which itself results from “unwise” popular
demands, a persistent theme in much contemporary commentary, especially from those
espousing fiscal austerity.
A third perspective is the political perspective, which posits the idea that the weaker
democratic institutions are, the more likely populism will emerge, as the main function of
institutions is to mediate between government and people. This can lead to people seeking
strong executive leadership, a leader/people, top-down form of political organization.34
Furthermore, each instance of populism reinforces the original context of institutional weak-
ness, thus paving the way for more populism. Populism then can become “a defining
characteristic of a political culture.” 35 This perspective again harkens back to the irresponsible,
gulliblemasses, choosing unsuitable leaderswho beguile themwith popular discourses, while
hiding their personal power-hungry, authoritarian intent.
The final ideological perspective has two versions: the Laclauian post-Marxist
version and more liberal versions. Ernesto Laclau’s more positive version argues
that the “populist rupture” is a moment whereby a path can be opened to establish
a radical democratic state.36 The liberal version considers the Laclauian version “too
vague”37 or too mechanistic in its assumptions and instead more negatively views
populism as a form of ideology.38 Nevertheless, both recognize three principal
elements as constituting populism: the leader, the people, and discourse linking
the two.
For Laclau, populism is linked to a “crisis of the dominant discourse which is in turn
part of a more general social crisis.”39 In other words, populism emerges as a result of an
ideological crisis of the dominant sectors within, and indeed caused by, a generalized
economic and social crisis. He argues that the “people” are defined through the dis-
course of the leader, building relations between the different elements of a populist
movement.40 This discourse consists primarily of an “appeal to the people” that aims to
33Roger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (eds), The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America (Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press, 1991); Jeffrey Y. Sachs, Social Conflict and Populist Politics in Latin America (San Francisco, CA: ICS Press, 1990).
34Nicos P. Mouzelis, Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarianism and Late Industrialisation in the Balkans and
Latin America (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1986); George Philip, “New Populism in Spanish America,” Government
and Opposition 33:1 (1993), pp. 81–87, 96.
35John Crabtree, “Populisms Old and New: The Peruvian Case,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 19:2 (2000),
pp. 163–76.
36See for example: Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism, Populism (London, UK: Verso,
1977); Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (London, UK; New York, NY: Verso, 2005); D.L. Raby, Democracy and Revolution: Latin
America and Socialism Today (London, UK; Ann Arbor MI: Pluto Press, 2006) amongst others.
37Jan Werner Müller, “‘The People Must Be Extracted from Within the People’: Reflections on Populism,” Constellations 2:
4 (2014), pp. 483–93.
38Ben Stanley, “The Thin Ideology of Populism,” Journal of Political Ideologies 13:1 (2008), pp. 95–110.
39Laclau, Politics and Ideology, p. 175.
40Ibid.
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isolate mediating institutions and establish a direct unmediated relationship between
the populist leader and the people.
Alternatively, Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser view populism as “a thin-
centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous
and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’ and which argues that
politics should be an expression of the volonté generale (general will) of the people.”41
“Pure people” and “corrupt elite” are “empty vessels filled in different ways by different
actors,” and how these are filled can be used to identify subtypes of populism.42 These can
be “left and right, be top-down or bottom-up, rely on strong leaders or even the
leaderless.”43 These analysts argue that their definition “travels well,” allows the definition
of sub-types of populism, and can link to supply-side and demand-side factors; thus, it can
examine both leaders and the different constituencies, which support them in analyses.44
Ben Stanley similarly views it as a “thin-centered ideology” with similar component
elements of leader, people, elite, and discourse;45 whereas, Jan Werner Müller argues
that it is essentially “totalitarian” and therefore ultimately anti-democratic.46 Indeed, most
such analyses (although not Laclau) seem to concur that populism is ultimately harmful
for democracy and its institutions, and that this stems from a tendency by leaders to listen
to the masses and act on their wishes in a manipulative, power-seeking manner.47
Populism’s Conceptual Utility
Given these varying interpretations of the concept, is populism an effective tool for
helping us understand contemporary politics? In addition, does it propose adequate
diagnoses and solutions to its dilemmas and complexities, particularly, in a context of
crisis? It is these questions which this section of the article seeks to address, using
Gerring’s criteria for assessing the utility of concepts in the social sciences.48
Gerring states that “concept formation lies at the heart of all social science endeavor”
and therefore it is crucial that we form “good” concepts.49 A well-formed concept then is
“an attempt to mediate among eight criteria: familiarity, resonance, parsimony, coher-
ence, differentiation, depth, theoretical utility, and field utility.”50 Hence, familiarity and
resonance refer to recognition levels for both a lay or academic audience. Parsimony
refers to the shortness both of the term itself (the extension) and, of its list of defining
attributes (the intension). A coherent concept is one which is internally consistent
between its instances and attributes; whereas, differentiation refers to the differences
between those instances and the attributes from other most-similar concepts. In other
41Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, “Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe




45Stanley, “Thin Ideology of Populism.”
46Werner Müller, “People Must Be Extracted from Within the People,” p. 484.
47Michael L. Conniff, “Introduction: Toward a Comparative Definition of Populism,” in Michael L. Conniff (ed.), Latin
American Populism in Comparative Perspective (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1982), pp. 3–29;
John Crabtree, “Populisms Old and New: The Peruvian Case,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 19:2 (2000), pp. 163–
76; Roberts, “Populism and Democracy.”
48Gerring, “What Makes a Concept Good?”
49Ibid., 359.
50Ibid., 367.
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words, how bounded, how operationalizable, is the concept? Depth refers to the
number of accompanying properties that are shared by the instances under definition.
Finally, theoretical utility denotes the level of usefulness within a wider field of infer-
ences, and field utility within a field of related instances and attributes.
Regarding the first two criteria – familiarity and resonance – the concept of populism is
certainly effective. As illustrated previously, populism has a high recognition factor judging by
the number of references to it by politicians, the media, and in the academy. There is a strong
cognitive link between “popular,” “people,” and “populism,” which reinforces this resonance.
Nevertheless, Herbert Gans, in his reflection on the term “underclass” in US social science and
media, suggests that such criteria can have negative impacts on the conduct of research.51 He
outlines how increasing competition in the academy and in journalism in the post-World War
II era led to pressures in the first to invent and popularize new concepts, and in the second to
use and misuse these. He identifies two “dangerous characteristics”52 emerging from this
dynamic: journalists failing to “define terms,” allowing readers to make their own, usually
negative, inferences from their meaning, and a feedback loop whereby such negative con-
notations seeped into academic usage of the term.53 He notes how social scientists are often
flatteredwhen journalists andmedia use their terms (or their interpretation of terms) and such
usage or exposure by the media does not go unnoticed by state funders of research at the
hour of awarding grants.54 More pertinently still, he warns that if concepts become used for
political purposes, “we run the danger of spoiling them for research purposes.”55 In the end,
what is most important is the creation of new ideas and new findings, and the best concepts
are those which serve those ends, rather than familiarity and resonance, and the public
attention these can draw. Gans therefore draws attention to the close and rather pernicious
relationship between the academy, the media and, indeed, politics, and how each influences
and conditions the behavior of the other.56
With regards to parsimony, while the term is short and to the point, its list of defining
features, historically at least, has been extensive, as outlined in the last section. Nor has usage
of the term in these different senses been abandoned; particularly, in media and political
discourse. As Ezequiel Adamovsky points out: “In current usages [populism] refers to a family
of ideologies, a variety of political movements, a type of regime, a ruling style, an economic
model, and a particularmode of political appellation.”57 As noted,more recent academicwork
has reduced the plethora of identifying features of the concept to three – the relation
between leader and people forged through an anti-elite and/or anti-minority discourse.
However, even these supposedly core characteristics of “people” and “elites” are questionable.
MarcoD’Eramo, for example, notes that BeppeGrillo of the Italian Five StarMovement, and ex-
Italian PrimeMinister Silvio Berlusconi have both been classified as populist, but have rarely, or
ever, used the term “the people.”58Moreover, analyses of populism tend to treat “elites” as just
51Herbert J. Gans, “Uses and Misuses of Concepts in American Social Science Research: Variations on Loȉc Wacquant’s
Theme of ‘Three Pernicious Premises in the Study of the American Ghetto,’” International Journal of Urban and






57Ezequiel Adamovsky, “Populism is Out of Control,” Telesur TV (June 3, 2015), available online at: http://www.telesurtv.
net/english/opinion/Populism-is-Out-of-Control-20150603-0042.html.
58D’Eramo, “Populism and the New Oligarchy.”
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another minority – yet, this omits any examination of the immense power that these elites
possess in so many different areas of social life, unlike vulnerable ethnic, religious, or sexual
minorities. Indeed, criticism of elites is viewed as inherently dangerous –whereas, a case could
be made, as William Sokoloff does, to argue that “popular hatred of elites is a good account-
ability mechanism and increases the legitimacy of the state.”59
Furthermore, the identified peripheral attributes of different populist phenomena
differ widely, diminishing the term’s coherence further. For example, while rejections
of elites may unite so-called right-populists and left-populists in Europe, their ideological
underpinnings are fundamentally distinct. Right-populists emphasize the cultural, asso-
ciating the notion of the people with the nation; whereas, left-populists associate it with
class;60 similarly, right-populists blame elites for increased immigration; whereas, left-
populists blame them for economic and political inequalities.61 In other words, there is
little coherence between so-called peripheral features, actual ideological content and
resulting policy programs and the “populist” core features (people, elites, and so on) and
peripheral features (actual policies) are disputed, diminishing the term’s coherence.
Ben Stanley,62 Rovira Kaltwasser, andMudde63 conceptualize populism as a “thin ideology”
in order to circumvent this problem, arguing that populism, the “thin ideology,” articulates
itself with a “full” ideology – to give it programmatic depth. Yet, this innovative solution raises
several problems. First, there is the question of how populists chose the “full” ideology with
which they articulate themselves. Stanley argues that this depends on what is “salient” in a
particular national context, what “resonates” in it.64 However, this does not explain how it is
decided which issues are “salient” and which are not, nor why populists decide to focus on
one or more “salient” issues over others. Missing entirely from this account is any suggestion
of the specific power relations, national and transnational, which may exist within a national
political space, their role in creating the conditions for the possible salience of some issues
over others, and of a particular approach to that issue, and how the supposed populist
phenomenon relates to these. In other words, “salience” is a result of hegemonic struggles
over meaning amongst established powers within a given territory, and different political
groups will be inserted into these struggles in different ways. In this conceptualization of
populism, the issue of prioritization is equally problematic. If populism is the “thin ideology,”
why should this be privileged in the analysis of a particular political movement over the “full”
ideology, which gives it its programmatic content?65 There are, therefore, real problems with
the concept of populism in terms of its supposed parsimony.
Regarding differentiation, one of the main counter-referents for populism is democ-
racy. Margaret Canovan66 famously claimed that populism is democracy’s “shadow” and
others its “specter”67 or its “mirror.”68 Yet, populism and democracy are both poorly
59William W. Sokoloff, “In Defense of Hatred,” New Political Science 37:2 (2015), pp. 163–80.
60Hanspeter Kriesi, “The Populist Challenge,” West European Politics 37:2 (2014), pp. 361–78.
61Matthijs Rooduijn and Tjitske Akkerman, “Flank Attacks: Populism and Left-Right Radicalism in Western Europe,” Party
Politics 1:12 (2015), pp. 1–12.
62Stanley, “Thin Ideology.”
63Mudde and Kaltwasser, “Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism.”
64Stanley, “Thin Ideology,” pp. 105–06.
65See below for a fuller discussion on this in the context of the left/right dichotomy.
66Margaret Canovan, “’Trust the People!’ Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy,” Political Studies XLVII (1999), pp. 2–16.
67Benjamin Arditi, “Populism as a Specter of Democracy: A Response to Canovan,” Political Studies 52:1 (2004), pp.
135–43.
68Francisco Panizza (ed.), Populism and the Mirror of Democracy (New York, NY; London, UK: Verso, 2005).
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bounded in most work on populism. First, as suggested previously, both can share
similar characteristics, such as electoralism and a concept of representativity.69
“Democratic” leaders also use anti-elite discourse, and talk about the “people”70 while
some so-called “populists” do not.71 Second, democracy itself is rarely defined by those
writing on populism, yet democracy is, as Gerring points out, citing Robert A. Dahl, “a
poxed term” precisely because of its essential contestability.72 Which democracy then do
analysts refer to when they discuss populism? This is rarely made explicit, but the
presumption usually is that it is liberal democracy or polyarchy. Third, not all parties
or movements labeled populist are anti-democratic. Andrea Mammone clearly shows
the anti-democratic, xenophobic, and racist nature of extreme far-right parties.73 Yet, the
use of the term populist to describe radical left parties, with radical democratic policies,
such as Podemos in Spain or Syriza in Greece, discursively links these parties to such
neo-fascist parties, unwittingly or not.74 While some academics are careful to differenti-
ate between left- and right-populism,75 the general usage of the term, especially in the
media as well as in the academy, implies that “populism” is anti-democratic, even
totalitarian as Müller claims, regardless of the programmatic content of the supposedly
populist movement.76 This is essentially misleading as it irons out and obscures impor-
tant distinctions in programmatic intent within the different instances being labeled
populist, which have a direct bearing on democracy, pluralism, and tolerance in our
societies.
Finally, it could be argued that the position presented here relativizes conceptual
work. Is the bar of conceptual clarity and utility set too low, with the result that most
political science concepts will not pass it?77 Yet, while most concepts are “essentially
contestable,” most will have some central characteristics that are accepted by the
majority of analysts.78 Democracy, for example, may be as Dahl put it, a “poxed term,”
but most models of democracy will have elections at their core.79 Some analysts may
argue about whether neoliberalism exists or not, or the extent to which it permeates
social life, or whether it is “a consistent ideology at all.”80 But, as Phillipp Ther convin-
cingly argues, the conceptual core of neoliberalism remains the same: “privatization. . .
and faith in the efficiency and rationality of the market.”81 As we have seen, populism
has no such internal conceptual stability.
Ultimately, as Houwen shows in his wide-ranging conceptual history of “populism,”
struggles over the meaning of the term “do not only stem from the semantic variability
69Müller, “Reflections on Populism.”
70Houwen, “Non-European Roots of the Concept of Populism,” p. 31.
71D’Eramo, “Populism and New Oligarchy,” p. 15.
72Gerring, “What Makes a Concept Good?” p. 379.
73Andrea Mammone, “The Eternal Return? Faux Populism and Contemporarization of Neo-Fascism across Britain, France
and Italy,” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 17:2 (2009), pp. 171–92.
74See, for example, Luis Ramiro and Raul Gomez, “Radical-Left Populism during the Great Recession: Podemos and Its
Competi-tion with the Established Radical Left,” Political Studies 65:15 (2017), pp. 108–26; Giorgos Katsambekis,
“Radical Left Populism in Contemporary Greece: Syriza’s Trajectory from Minoritarian Opposition to Power,”
Constellations 23:3 (2016), pp. 391–403 for the respective Spanish and Greek cases.
75For example: Mudde and Kaltwasser, “Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism.”
76Müller, “Reflections on Populism.”
77Thanks to one of the reviewers for making this point.
78William B. Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56:1 (1955), pp. 167–98.
79Merkel, “Crisis of Democracy.”
80Phillipp Ther, Europe Since 1989: A History (Princeton, NJ; Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press, 2016), p. 99.
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of the concept, but also from political struggles to define the word.”82 Perhaps, it is
those political struggles we should be discussing, rather than the meaning of “popu-
lism.” Indeed, the current situation of crisis demands that our analysis goes beyond just
talk of populism to much deeper questions such as: How can democracy help solve the
“crisis of inequalities”? How must it change and adapt to do so? Indeed, what type of
democracy do we need to help tackle this crisis? This point will become further apparent
if one examines academic discourse on comparing Hugo Chávez and Donald Trump as
populists.
Chávez and Trump: Two of a Kind?
Coming up to, and beyond, the November 2016 US general elections, which as is well
known Donald J. Trump went on to win, a slew of media articles in mostly US media
outlets were published comparing Trump with the late Venezuelan president Hugo
Chávez (1954–2013) as populists. This section will review a number of those found
through a time-bound internet search using Lexis Nexis, with the names Trump/
Chávez in the title. Here, I will first review the majority of these, endorsing the compar-
ison, and then those which reject it or have reservations about it, before going on to
discuss these positions in the context of the argument advanced so far.
Those who fully endorse the comparison characterize both men along four main
lines.83 First, they see both men as strong leaders with authoritarian tendencies,
which ultimately undermine existing institutionality. Second, they accept that there
are important ideological and policy differences between them, but argue that
these differences are largely irrelevant, as they share a common “populist” ideolo-
gical position that the “people” shall rule and that the elites and/or minorities shall
not interfere with that rule. Third, both Chávez and Trump use discourse as a
strategy to achieve power, which is anti-pluralist in nature, dividing the social
space into the “people vs. the elite.” However, “the people” in each country is
composed of differing groups: Chávez argued in defense of the “downtrodden” and
“non-white,” whereas Trump favors “white Christians.” While for Chávez, the enemy
was the elites, for Trump it is racial and religious minorities and immigrants from
82Houwen, “Non-European Roots,” p. 3.
83Alberto Barrera Tyska, “What Hugo Chávez Tells Us About Donald Trump,” The New York Times (September 20, 2016),
available online at: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/21/opinion/what-hugo-chavez-tells-us-about-donald-trump.
html?action=click&contentCollection=Opinion&module=RelatedCoverage&region=EndOfArticle&pgtype=article; Rory
Carroll, “Insult, Provoke, Repeat: How Donald Trump Became America’s Hugo Chávez,” The Guardian (June 22,
2016), available online at: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jun/22/donald-trump-hugo-chavez-political-
similarities; Carlos de la Torre, “Will Democracy Survive Trump’s Populism? Latin America May Tell Us,” The New York
Times (December 15, 2016), available online at: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/15/opinion/will-democracy-sur
vive-trumps-populism-latin-america-may-tell-us.html; Ioan Grillo, “Is Donald Trump an American Hugo Chávez?” The
New York Times (November 4, 2016), available online at: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/04/opinion/is-donald-
trump-an-american-hugo-chavez.html; Sean Illing, “Trump Ran As A Populist. He’s Governing As An Elitist. He’s Not
The First,” Vox (June 23, 2017), available online at: https://www.vox.com/2017/6/23/15791432/donald-trump-popu
lism-latin-america-republican-party; Jennifer McCoy, “COLUMN-What Hugo Chávez and Donald Trump Have in
Common,” Reuters (March 31, 2016), available online at: https://www.reuters.com/article/mccoy-chavez/column-
what-hugo-chvez-and-donald-trump-have-in-common-idUSL2N1731U1; Andrés Miguel Rondón, “To Beat President
Trump, You Have to Learn to Think Like his Supporters,” The Washington Post (December 26, 2017), available online
at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/12/26/to-beat-president-trump-you-have-to-
learn-to-think-like-his-supporters/?utm_term=.8f0cbc8cb19c; Joel Simon, “What Does Trump Have in Common With
Hugo Chavez? A Media Strategy,” Columbia Journalism Review (February 17, 2017), available online at: https://www.
cjr.org/opinion/trump-chavez-media.php.
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“shithole” countries. Fourth, both leaders have a common media strategy, whereby,
on the one hand, both manipulate the media through a variety of tactics and
“stunts” to gain attention, but on the other, they attack any media which question
them and their behavior.84 Cumulatively, these characteristics and tactics under-
mine democratic “checks and balances,” capturing, for example, the judiciary and
attacking civil society, in order to control political power. The overall result is a
highly polarized society which, in Venezuela, led to a “slowly strangled democracy”
and ultimately authoritarianism.85 Americans therefore need to be vigilant that
Trump does not do the same. Returning to the distinct analytical perspectives to
populism outlined previously, these approaches to the two leaders are a combina-
tion of the political and ideological with their emphasis on top-down, manipulative
leadership and the use the concept of the “people” against elites and minorities.
Those who reject the comparison, or parts of it, argue that there are radical
differences in terms of the class and racial background of the two men, in their
ideological and policy stances,86 and even in their levels of intelligence.87 In terms
of origins, both Tim Gill and Pablo Vivanco point out that Trump’s wealthy, white
family background contrasts markedly to Chávez’s poor, mixed race family, which
inevitably shaped their respective political approaches.88 Trump, therefore, is decid-
edly pro-free market, using the state to enrich the already rich; whereas, Chávez
used the state to right market-created inequalities and poverty, by directing
resources to the poor. Chávez, moreover, consistently aimed to include minorities,
such as the indigenous, or to end discrimination, such as against women; whereas,
Trump seeks to exclude and scapegoat minorities, is heavily supported by white
supremacists and neo-Nazis, and, rather than supporting women’s political strug-
gles for equality, seeks to “grab [them] by their pussies.” Additionally, regarding
refugees, Chávez began the task of nationalizing some of the five million
Colombian refugees living in Venezuela, and provided access to social programs
for all these refugees regardless of their legal status. Trump, on the other hand,
demonizes refugees and migrants and is seeking to expel millions of them, and to
build a wall on the US-Mexican border ostensibly to stop more arriving. Finally,
Vivanco argues that during his presidency, Chávez consistently advocated for
peace, despite his military background. He spoke out against the US-led invasion
of Afghanistan in 2001 and of Iraq in 2003, and had an active participation in the
Colombian peace process. Trump, on the other hand, is bellicose in his rhetoric,
using the threat of war as a negotiating strategy and aiming to massively increase
military spending.89 Gill, however, accepts that there are similarities in terms of
both men’s rhetoric and style, as well as in terms of their autocratic centralization
84Barrera Tyska, “What Hugo Chávez Tells Us About Donald Trump.”
85Carlos de la Torre, “Will Democracy Survive Trump’s Populism?”
86Pablo Vivanco, “5 Reasons Why Comparing Trump to Hugo Chávez Is Nonsense,” Telesur (October 20, 2016), available
online at: https://www.telesurtv.net/english/analysis/5-Reasons-Why-Comparing-Trump-to-Hugo-Chavez-Is-Nonsense-
20161020-0023.html; Tim Gill, “People Are Comparing Donald Trump To Hugo Chávez. That’s Mostly Wrong,” The
Washington Post (October 17, 2016), available online at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/
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87John Patrick Leary, “No, Donald Trump is Not Hugo Chávez,” Venezuelanalysis (October 24, 2016), available online at:
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of power in the office of the president; but, these similarities shall not overshadow
the aforementioned important background, ideological, and policy differences.90
In this article, I have argued that populism’s conceptual usefulness can be subject to
three central criticisms: its conceptual looseness; its normative bias equating democracy
with its liberal variant; and, its use as a label to side-line challengers to the status quo.
The overall effect is to stymie and curtail necessary discussion on what I have called the
“crisis of inequalities” and its relation to democracy. The debate comparing Trump and
Chávez as populists, I argue here, confirms the validity of these criticisms.
Regarding populism’s conceptual looseness, this debate confirms a consensus
around the political and ideological approaches to populism, and reveals a variety
of weaknesses inherent to these approaches. Earlier, I argued that populism had
problems regarding its parsimony and its differentiation, specifically with reference to
democracy, and in the Trump/Chávez debate, these problems are encountered again.
With regards to parsimony, while there is an agreed core of attributes around the
leader/people nexus within the debate, this is prioritized at the expense of the very
wide ideological and policy differences between the two. This is justified due to the
outcomes of the leader/people discursive nexus, which, it is argued, ineluctably leads
to exclusion and, eventually, authoritarianism. However, as Gabriel Hetland points
out, in a debate led by David Smilde on the comparison between the two leaders, a
key similarity between both leaders “is that there are inclusionary and exclusionary
elements within both. . ..”91 In the case of Chávismo, the poor have been included,
while elites and any oppositional elements are excluded; for Trump, the opposition is
also excluded, but there are also attempts to include “certain valid working class
grievances related to those who have lost out vis-a-vis trade, etc.”92 Populism then
can contain “quite contradictory elements of both inclusion and exclusion and
popular empowerment and elite control.”93
Hetland’s observation indeed points to the following key criticism regarding the
conceptual use of populism: its poor boundedness vis-a-vis other concepts; in
particular, democracy. In effect, all politics deals with inclusion/exclusion, because,
as Lasswell famously observed, politics is about deciding “who gets what.”94
Inevitably, then, some will be excluded and some included at the time of policy-
making with accompanying rhetoric to justify this. D’Eramo points out, for example,
that US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt used discourse to justify the introduc-
tion of policies protecting workers and limiting corporate and financial power.95 In
the current context, many conservative leaders rhetorically divide the social space
into two: US Republican Speaker Paul Ryan into “takers and makers”96; George
Osborne, (ex-) United Kingdom (UK) Conservative Chancellor between “strivers and
90Gill, “People are Comparing.”
91Gabriel Hetland contribution to David Smilde, “Debate on the Hugo Chávez / Donald Trump Comparison,” WOLA
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skivers”97; and, Leo Varadkar, current Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister), into “those who
pay for everything, and those who pay nothing and expect everything for free.”98 All
three of these conservative politicians then divide the social space, excluding some
(usually the poor) while seeking to include others (that is the “middle class” and the
rich); yet, none of these are considered “populist.” It seems, then, that only those
who seek to favor the poor over the wealthy are considered populist, despite similar
dividing tactics used by those who favor the rich, suggesting a selective bias in
application of the concept rather than a strictly social scientific rationale.
Within almost all contributions to the Trump/Chávez debate, democracy is taken
as equivalent to its liberal variant, with the pronounced emphasis on the need for
pluralism and checks and balances on the executive. Yet, the previous observation
raises questions on the ability of liberal democracy to deal adequately with the
problem of inequality. In those contributions which argued in favor of the com-
parison, there was little discussion on this key point. Many did recognize that
inequalities were causes for the emergence of both presidents, but these were
usually afterthoughts and very few indeed suggested alternatives. Andrés Miguel
Rondón argues, somewhat condescendingly, in one of his opinion pieces, that
groups opposing populist leaders need to go to where the poor live and partici-
pate in things which they enjoy, such as (in Venezuela) playing dominos, dancing
salsa, or playing baseball.99 Jennifer McCoy observes that both Trump and Chávez
emerged out of “a devastating recession and a decades-long trend of deepening
income inequality and social immobility.”100 Rory Carroll acknowledges that popu-
lists can help “spur a much-needed shake-up of complacent parties.”101 None of
these analysts and commentators, however, offers any indication as to how these
parties should respond to the issue of inequalities. The implication is that only
liberal democracy can deal with this problem, even when it is from within that
system that policies encouraging inequality have been implemented. While some
see populists as classic “bait and switchers,” “campaigning like populists, but
governing like elites,”102 there are many social democratic parties in Europe, for
example, which have done the same.103
In effect, as Smilde points out, the Trump/Chávez discussion is a debate between the
prevalence of form or of content in conceptions of democracy. The political scientists
concentrate on formal, institutional aspects of democracy (form), while sociologists
“focus on the substantive elements of democracy, i.e., inequalities,” (content).104 The
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discussion then is less about these two leaders and more about the very nature of
democracy itself.105 Smilde concludes that “the exclusionary political tactics of populism
will eventually undermine whatever progress was made in terms of the ‘other’ inequal-
ities,” culminating in authoritarianism.106 Yet, this fails to acknowledge the responsibility
of liberal democracy for deepening these inequalities and the lack of adequate
responses from liberal democratic political actors as to how or even if they may remedy
them. In other words, the problem becomes populism, rather than the critical issues
around inequality, which give rise to the phenomena branded as “populism,” and the
solution offered is simply to get rid of the “populist.” In this way, the Trump/Chávez
debate underscores my earlier point: that necessary discussion on the “crisis of inequal-
ities” is side-tracked into futile comparisons between very different political phenomena,
and facile short-term solutions are offered in lieu of fundamental policy reviews on the
key issues within this crisis and the capacity of actually existing democracy to deal with
these effectively.
Populism in a Context of Crisis
Why then does theory on populism eschew discussion on the “crisis of inequalities” in
favor of futile comparisons of widely differing political reactions to this crisis? Indeed, does
theory on populism admit crisis as a cause of so-called “populism?” This is important, as a
key argument in this article is that populism is not useful as a concept to deal with a
context of crisis. In this section, then, I will first discuss the role crisis plays in theory on
populism as analyzed by Moffitt.107 Moffitt identifies three views on the role of crisis in the
literature on populism: causal, agnostic, and skeptical. He adds his own fourth view,
arguing that crisis is internal to populism, as populists seek to “perpetuate crisis” in their
own interests. In response to this, I will argue, reviewing work by Roitman,108 Walby,109
and Merkel110 that crises are ill-defined periods subject to temporal, definitional, and
policy manipulation by hegemonic social forces through narrative and discourse. Rather
than seeing crisis as internal to populism, as Moffitt does, I will argue that the use of the
concept of populism itself in academic, media, and political discourse is part of this wider
hegemonic struggle to define crisis and settle its outcomes.
Crisis has long been a central but disputed element in theories on populism. Moffitt
identifies three positions on the relationship between populism and crisis, four when
we include his own position.111 The first, evident in the discursive and political
approaches to populism, sees crisis as an essential or important causal element in
the emergence of populism. Second, there is an “agnostic” position held by those who
take what Moffitt calls a minimalist, or what I have termed an “ideological” approach to
populism, which acknowledges the role of crisis in “setting the scene” for populism,
but does not see “the relationship between them as necessarily causal.”112 Finally, a
105Smilde, “Trump/Chávez Debate.”
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third position, held by those such as Knight or Arditi, rejects outright the link between
crisis and populism.113 Knight argues that the concept of crisis is too vague to be of
any analytical value; whereas, Arditi feels that concentrating on crisis runs the risk of
excluding populist phenomena, which do not use crisis as a central part of their appeal
to the electorate. Moffitt’s own contribution is that these previous positions view crisis
as something external to populism; whereas, he sees it as internal. He agrees that crisis
is an elusive concept, but argues, following Reinhart Kosseleck, Roitman, and Colin
Hay, that it can only be “experienced through performance and mediation.”114 This
means that “populist actors actively perform and perpetuate a sense of crisis, rather
than simply reacting to external crisis.”115 In this way, crisis is “a central feature of the
phenomenon itself.”116
Yet, a factor that Moffitt neglects to consider is if actual discourse and discussion on
populism is in itself part of a greater and more wide-ranging discussion on crisis and the
meaning of democracy. Both Roitman and Walby, for example, concur that while crises
are real events – with real, devastating implications for real people – their meaning is
socially constructed through discourses and narrative.117 The actual narrative of a crisis –
how it happened and why it happened – is a site of hegemonic struggle between
different social forces, with the victors ultimately defining the crisis and, more impor-
tantly, the social settlement which emerges from it.
Merkel looks more specifically at the concept of “crisis of democracy” and its relation
to inequality. He defines crises as “system-threatening. . ..when challenges to democ-
racy. . ..produce actors who have the resources and strategic capabilities to confront the
important power elites of the old system.”118 While he remains agnostic on the existence
of such a crisis in the present context, he does find challenges in three areas central to
democracy’s good functioning: participation, representation, and governance.119 In
terms of the first, sharp rises in socio-economic inequality have been rapidly translated
into political inequality with the result that the “disadvantaged lower strata of society do
hardly anything to make their voice heard and heard effectively against this
development.”120 The results are “simulative democracies,” with hollowed out demo-
cratic institutions.121 Governance structures meanwhile are dominated by globalized
markets and supranational political institutions, such as the European Union, whereby
the “former operate in the individual pursuit of profit, [while] the latter have so far not
been democratized to any considerable degree.”122 As a result, he warns that:
the equality principle of democracy has been affected by two-fold oligarchization: socio-
economically driven political self-exclusion of the lower classes and the self-liberation of the
top 1 per cent. . ..of the income hierarchy from the social responsibility that comes with
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This “reduced form of democracy” may escape acute crisis “for the moment,” but in the
long term, it will make it a much less attractive form of government, as it will not be
fulfilling its function to “constantly monitor and correct inequalities in income and life
chances,” which political equality is supposed to ensure.124
Merkel’s account therefore, along with Roitman and Walby, implies a role for narrative
and discourse in the identification and characterization of crises.125 Yet, Merkel also
points to two real problems in the exercise of democracy. First, he illustrates the need to
integrate, as Walby insists, analyses from other domains, such as the economic and the
social, into our political analysis, in order to arrive at a more accurate macro view of the
contemporary state of democracy.126 Second, we need to evaluate the role of the many
political organizations labeled “populist” from a non-normative and empirical perspec-
tive, that is, to examine the extent to which each of these can contribute or not to the
quality of our democracies in this more macro sense. The argument until now suggests
that the concept of populism fails on both these counts. First, as illustrated by the
Trump/Chávez discussion previously, form is prioritized over substance in theory on
populism. Second, theory on “inclusive” or “exclusive” populism is too diffuse to balance
the dominance of liberal institutionality in populist theory, with little integration of the
economic and social domains into its overall theoretical arc. Third, and finally, this
emphasis on institutionality emerges from a normative bias in defense of liberal democ-
racy as the only possible democracy, and fails to assess and learn from integrative
measures and mechanisms taken by governments labeled populist on their own
terms. Examples here would be the many innovative participatory and direct democracy
mechanisms instituted in some left-led Latin American countries, including
Constitutional Assemblies, procedures for recall of public representatives, community
councils in Venezuela, and the notion of “plurinationality” in Bolivia to help encompass
different ethnicities and cultures into one political space.127 In the literature on popu-
lism, the value of such experiments is largely dismissed as simply part of the manip-
ulative scheming by the populist leader to undermine liberal institutions and perpetuate
his own autocratic power, rather than as possible valuable lessons as to how actually
existing democracy can adapt to survive.
Conclusion: Must We Talk about Populism?
In this article, I have sought to critically examine the concept of populism and its
overwhelming popularity amongst media, politicians, and, in particular the academy.
First, I provided an overview of conceptual work on populism, demonstrating how an
ideological usage is now dominant, emphasizing the core elements of the “pure” people,
124Ibid., 20.
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the “corrupt” elite, and the use of discourse to establish links between leader and
people. This is also associated with a political usage, or the charismatic strong leader
and the subservient masses. Nor are previous sociological or economic usages forgotten,
but rather persist in media and political circles.
I then used Gerring’s criteria of conceptual goodness to argue three points.128 First,
that the concept is conceptually loose, leading to the inclusion of many movements,
parties, and leaders which have, in fact, little in common and, often, do not satisfy basic
criteria. Second, that analysis is usually informed by an unacknowledged normative bias
equating democracy with its liberal variant, despite the existence of distinct philosophi-
cal and theoretical approaches to its realization. Third, the concept acts as a label that
marginalizes political movements challenging the political status quo regardless of their
ideological positions or programmatic proposals. This, I argue, stifles debate necessary in
a time of increasing uncertainty and crisis, most notably around the nature of democracy
and how inequality relates to democracy. In effect, the problems underpinning the crisis
are supplanted by concern about “populism” itself. Indeed, “populism” becomes the
crisis, rather than the underlying issues that have led to it, and the solution deemed
simply to get rid of the “populist.”
Following on from this discussion, I illustrated these contradictions through an
examination of various opinion articles in the US media comparing Presidents Trump
and Chávez. Here, I argued that these pieces displayed characteristics of the ideological
and political views of populism, concentrating on how both presidents undermine the
formal, institutional aspects of democracy, while de-emphasizing issues around substan-
tive democracy relating to greater levels of socio-economic inequality. I concluded that
ultimately these discussions were about the very nature of democracy, and, most
importantly, its response to the “crisis of inequalities,” but that this more fundamental
discussion is obscured by a normative discussion around the supposed dangers of
populists.
Finally, I interrogated the concept of crisis as this is central to theorizing on populism,
although rarely examined in depth. Here, I concluded that crises were ill-defined periods,
subject to temporal, definitional, and policy manipulation by hegemonic social powers
through narrative and discourse. I concluded that while Moffitt argued that crisis was
internal to populism, discussion on populism was itself internal to crisis. In other words,
the use of the concept diverts attention away from the aforementioned fundamental
questions on democracy and its relation to inequality. Social scientists therefore need to
respond to this debate with more conceptual rigor. The question then is: Which concept
or concepts could provide this? Here, I argue that a return to a simple left/right
dichotomy is the best means to order political phenomena.
It is fashionable in the present context to argue that the left/right dichotomy shall be
abandoned, and theory on populism certainly contributes to that trend, collapsing left
and right in its over-arching term. I argue otherwise. Norberto Bobbio views inequality
as fundamental to the left/right distinction.129 Those on the left view inequalities as
natural but modifiable through policy; whereas, those on the right view them as
necessary, but inconsequential in a context of the rule of law. Alan Noȅl and Jean-
128Gerring, “What Makes a Concept Good?”
129Norberto Bobbio, Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1996).
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Phillipe Therién130 see the dichotomy as “unavoidably inherent in political life and
foundational for democracy,”131 allowing a “structured conversation” without which
“political debates tend to remain inchoate, and centered on personalities, images, and
patronage.”132 It is, hence, the “core currency of political exchange [providing] a simple
and universal language that helps citizens, politicians and experts make sense of
politics.”133 The concept of populism, I argue here, contributes to such inchoate political
debates, by ironing out these fundamental differences, effectively eliding it from
discussion.
Even when it is integrated into theory, it ends up overshadowed by the catch-all
vagueness of populism. As discussed earlier, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser’s differentia-
tion between “inclusionary” or “exclusionary” populism remains diffused as these are not
so easily separated analytically and are indeed inherent in all politics. Moreover, the term
populism remains the main explanatory concept, and the left/right dichotomy residual,
obscuring the primary ideological indicators of the political phenomenon under study.
Mammone makes this very point in his interrogation of the use of populism to describe
what he terms as “right-wing extremist” groups in Europe.134 He argues that the use of
the term populist to describe these parties runs the risk of “over-simplifying their party
philosophies, decontextualising analysis, and by-passing their ‘burden of the past.’”135
Rather than populist, these movements are in effect “a contemporarization of neo-
fascism within a post-materialist and global society” and should be recognized as
such.136 Attaching the label populism to them as the descriptive signifier, only obscures
these more salient and important characteristics; recognizing them as “right-wing,”
however, brings them to the fore and helps differentiate them more sharply from radical
left political expressions. A prioritization of the left/right dichotomy in analysis, there-
fore, brings much greater conceptual clarity than populist categorizations.
It is unlikely, however, that the dominance of populism as a concept in political
discourse will wane any time soon. As I discussed previously with regard to Gans, the
concept is too deeply embedded in the nexus between the media, politics, and the
academy to be easily dislodged from its dominance.137 This is no accident, as it provides
the intellectual support for a false distinction between a so-called, auto-denominated,
“moderate center” and its supposed extremes on left and right.138 Populism, indeed, has
become a heuristic device to help perpetuate what Tamás identifies as “the elite’s
uprising against The People, and not vice versa.”139 In this article, I have defined
populism as a theoretical academic tradition used, intentionally or not, to negatively
counterpose electorally democratic but non-liberal political organizations over the
existing liberal democratic parties, despite the role the latter have had in the production







136Ibid., 187, emphasis in original.
137Gans,“ Uses and Misuses of Concepts.”
138D’Eramo, “Populism and the New Oligarchy.”
139Gáspár Miklós Tamás, “The Mystery of ‘Populism’ Finally Unveiled” (February 24, 2017), available online at: https://
www.opendemocracy.net/wfd/can-europe-make-it/g-m-tam-s/mystery-of-populism-finally-unveiled.
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of the very inequalities which give rise to the former in the first place. The choice then
for social scientists, in using the concept of populism, is between helping perpetuate the
elite revolt identified by Tamás, or to seek more effective, precise conceptual tools to
help ordinary citizens resist the continued embedding of oligarchical rule into our
democratic structures.
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